
The "Three Prisoners Problem" is a famous probability paradox that shares the same structure as the Monty Hall Problem.
Upon hearing information from a guard, Prisoner A rejoices, thinking "My chances of survival have gone up!" However, standard mathematical explanations reject this, stating, "The probability remains 1/3, and rejoicing that it increased to 1/2 is an illusion of intuition."
But is Prisoner A's joy really just an "illusion" or a "foolish misunderstanding"? Actually, Prisoner A's intuition makes perfect sense within a specific framework. This problem is not a calculation error, but arises from a difference in interpretation—specifically, "which information is used as the premise." Let's explain both perspectives clearly.
Problem Formulation
The situation is as follows:
There are three prisoners (A, B, and C). Two will be executed, and only one will be pardoned and released.
Who will be released is predetermined, and the guard knows who it is.Prisoner A, not allowed to ask his own fate directly, begs the guard:
"Since at least one of B and C will certainly be executed, telling me the name of one who will be executed wouldn't give me any information about my own fate, right?"The guard agrees and answers, "Prisoner B will be executed."
Question: In the subjective view of Prisoner A hearing these words, did his probability of being released increase from the original 1/3 to 1/2?
Why Do Opinions Diverge?
Why "Remains 1/3" is Considered Correct (Conventional Explanation)
As an objective test of mathematics and probability theory, "remains 1/3" is considered the correct answer. This is the result of calculating using all the hidden premise information: "who will be released is predetermined" and "the guard is answering according to the rules."
If Prisoner A is to be released, the guard will randomly name either "B" or "C."
If Prisoner C is to be released, the guard must name "B."
Therefore, the fact that the guard answered "B" does not affect A's prior probability of survival (1/3); it simply means the remaining Prisoner C's probability of survival jumps to 2/3.

Is Rejoicing that it "Became 1/2" an Illusion?
So, is intuitively rejoicing—"B is gone, so it's a 50/50 between me and C, the probability is 1/2!"—just an illusion? No, it is not.
This is the result of calculating using only the definitive, obvious information, while purposely not using the procedural information that "who will be released is predetermined."

Comparing the Differences in Interpretation (Information Selection)
As a mathematical problem asking for an objective probability, "1/3"—which uses all the rules—is the correct answer. However, this is also a problem asking about the process of subjective recognition: "Should Prisoner A rejoice upon hearing the guard's words?"
When humans acquire information, the brain first processes the "visible, obvious facts." The moment the obvious fact "B will be executed" is added to the situation "1 out of 3 is released," it is a perfectly natural information-processing reaction for the brain to feel, "Only C and I are left, so it's 1/2!"
It is only afterward, by cooling down, recalling the unseen premise that "who is released is predetermined," and recalculating, that one realizes, "Ah, it was 1/3 after all." Rejoicing at feeling it is 1/2 the instant one hears about B from the guard is by no means foolish.
Furthermore, while the premise stated it was "predetermined," in the real world, there is no guarantee that this is true. There is even room to think that the outcome might be decided randomly (1/2) between the remaining two unconfirmed people (A and C) from now on.
Conclusion: Neither is Wrong
Unlike the Monty Hall Problem, this problem does not involve "changing actual behavior (like switching doors) based on interpretation." It is a problem of recognition—how one's subjective probability changed. Refusing to be bound by unclear rules and viewing the situation positively as 1/2 based solely on obvious facts is by no means illogical.
In our published paper, [Generalized Classification of Inference Errors and Resolution of Paradoxes for ASI], we classify this problem not as a collapse of logic, but as a "Problem-Framing Error" (a difference in information selection).
The difference in answers simply comes down to the brain's inference frame: whether it processes "visible information" first, or processes everything including "hidden rule information." The calculations within both frameworks are not wrong.


